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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
PERJURY IN OUR COURTS
By
ALFRED DAVID WHITMAN*

I.

THE PROBLEM

Perjury runs rampant throughout our judicial system. So say the cases, the
textwriters, legislatures, lawyers and judges. "The opinion that perjury is common in our trial courts is one on which all of the writers on the question seem to
be in complete agreement", writes McClintock.' "Hundreds of persons perjure
themselves in the courts every day except Sunday", states another writer. 2 One
speaker estimated to his audience that perjury is present in fifty percent of contested civil actions, seventy-five percent of criminal cases and ninety percent of
divorce cases.3 ". . . the crime of perjury pollutes the stream of justice at its
source ....We all know that this crime is one of the most serious and that its ef-

4
fects are far-reaching, obstructive and destructive."
Yet prosecutions for perjury are rare. One writer declares:
"The latest statistics issued by the U. S. government giving the number of inmates in American penal institutions do not even have a classification for perjury; and I venture the assertion that there are not more
than 150
persons in the whole United States serving sentences for this
5
crime."
Of 50,729 cases of major offences reported by twenty-eight states and the
District of Columbia in 1937 to the Census Bureau, only 187, or 3.7 of one percent, were prosecutions for perjury. 6 McClintock found only 313 cases, about
twenty-two a year, of perjury or associated crimes in the years 1935 to 1939 reported in the Fourth Decennial Digest. 7 The District Attorney of New York disposed of only 107 such cas'es between 1900 and 1906.8 It is quite clear that, as one

writer puts it,

"

. . . gross palpable and persistent perjuries daily occurring are

suffered to pass without chastisement by the ministers of the law.9
Few crimes except fornication are more prevalent or carried off with greater
impunity.
In looking for the causes of this situation, one is confronted again and again
with the statement that, "One reason for these figures is that perjury is one of the
Assistant District Attorney of the City of Philadelphia.
I H. L. McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727 (1940).
2 Note, Problems of Successful Perjury, 78 Sol. J. 423 (1934).
3 Harry Hibschman, You Do Solemnly Swear, 24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 901 (1934).
4 United States v. Otto, 54 F.2d 277 (C.C.A. 2d 1931).
5 See n. 3, supra.
6 See n. 1, supra.
7 Ibid.
8 Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 Col. L. Rev. 67 (1908).
9 Ibid.
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most difficult crimes to establish within the law and to the satisfaction of juries." 10
That. this is, indeed, even layman's knowledge is indicated by the United Press
headline in a background article on the Army-McCarthy hearings reading, "Perjury Charge among Hardest to G3t Conviction". It has been said, "The difficulty of convicting in cases of perjury is one of the greatest blots in the law." 1
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
To remove at least one obstacle to obtaining convictions, several states have
legislated changes in the criminal law. The new laws provide that perjury shall
consist of the willful giving of contradictory statements under oath. The requisite
falsity may be proven, not only as before, by the direct testimony of two credible
witnesses or the testimony of one witness and proof of other corroborative circumstances, but also simply by proving that the defendant gave willful, conflicting
statements, both of which cannot be true.
New York adopted such a statute in 1936,12 with Utah copying the New
York statute word for word in 1937,18 and Illinois doing similarly in 1953.14
Nw Jersey enacted a similar false swearing statute in 1935.15 Canada considered
its passage in 1953.16 None of the new legislation, except the Canadian bill, requires that the proceedings in which the alleged contradictory statements were made
be judicial proceedings, but the testimony must have been under oath. To further
eliminate obstacles to prosecution, none of the legislation passed requires that the
testimony be on a material matter.
The New York and Utah statutes declare that perjury in the second degree
"may be established by proof of the willful giving or making of such contradictory
testimony or statements, without proof of which thereof is true .. .the falsity of
the testimony or statement shall be presumptively established by proof that the
defendant has testified, declared, deposed or certified under oath to the contrary
thereof on any occasion on which an oath is required by law"."7 [Emphasis added.]
New Jersey law provides that "proof that both statements were made under
oath duly administered is prima facie evidence that one or the other is false, and if
the jury are satisfied from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that one or
the other is false and that false statement was wilful ... it shall be sufficient for
a conviction". 1 8 [Emphasis added.]
II.

10 See n. 3, supra.
11 G. Lamb in Speech on the Courts of Common Law, delivered in the Hans Par]. Debate, 2d
series, XVIII 867, quoted in Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 7, p. 275, n. 1, 3rd ed., 1940.
12 39 New York Statutes-Penal Laws, pt. 2, art. 158, Perjury, §§ 1627 and 1627a, as amended; L.
1936 c. 92, §§ 1 and 2, effective July 1, 1936.
13 Utah Code Ann., tit. 76, c. 45, Perjury, §§ 76, 45, 11 and 12; L. 1937, c. 134, §§ 7 and 8;
c. 1943, §§ 103, 43, 14 and 15.
14 1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1395, amending § 227 and adding § 227a; c. 38, § 473.
16 New Jersey Stat. Ann. 2A: 131-4 and 5; L. 1935, c. 286, §§ 1 and 4, pp. 916 and 917; supp.
to L. 1898, c. 235.

16
and
17
18

Bill No. 93 passed the Canadian Senate, received its second reading in the House of Commons
was referred to a special committee on criminal law.
See n.'s 12 and 13, supra.
See n. 15, supra.
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Illinois, after due meditation, passed a similar statute in April, 1953. The
bill, sponsored by the Chicago Crime Commission, a civic group active in fighting
crime, was introduced in the 1947, 1949, 1951 and 1953 legislatures. As to contradictory testimony, the law of Illinois now declares, ".

.

. falsity shall be pre-

sumptively established by proof that the defendant has given such testimony or
made such statements under oath . . . without proving which statement or testi-

mony is true, or which is false ... "19 [Emphasis added.]
Canada considered the passage of a far harsher law than the foregoing, providing imprisonment up to fourteen years for a witness in a judicial proceeding
who gives material contradictory testimony "unless he establishes that none of the
evidence was given with intent to mislead". 20 Proof of the contradiction passes
the onus to the defendant to prove his lack of willfulness.
III.

PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The federal law of perjury is as follows:
"Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes any material
matter which he does not believe to be
2
true, is guilty of perjury." '
On April 12, 1954, the Attorney General of the United States, the Honorable
Herbert Brownell, transmitted to Congress a letter and a draft of proposed legislation to extend the law of perjury to the willful giving of contradictory statements under oath. Pursuant to the Attorney General's recommendation, the proposed legislation was introduced on May 18, by Senator Homer Ferguson in the
Senate, (S 3474), and by Representative Daniel A. Reed in the House of Representatives, (HR 9170), and referred, in 'each house, to the respective Committee
oil the Judiciary. It is this bill which is the subject of this paper.
The text of the proposed law reads:
"That Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 79, is amended by adding immediately after section 1622 the following:
1623. Contradictory statements
Whoever, having made a willful statement on a material matter
ither in proceedings before a grand jury or during the trial of any case,
within three years thereafter makes oath or affirmation to a willful contradictory statement, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished as provided in section 1621. Such perjury may be established by proof of the
willful giving or making of such contradictory statements without alleging
or proving which one thereof is false."
19

See n. 14, supra.

20 See n. 16, supra.
21 18 U.S.C., c. 79, Perjury, § 1621.
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The 'bill is not as inclusive as the prior federal law or the various state statutes
heretofore presented, in that it relates specifically only to grand jury and trial proceedings, thereby excluding pre-trial depositions, affidavits, certificates, etc. There
is also a specific limitation as to the time within which the contradictory statement must be given in order to merit prosecution. The bill further differs in that
the prosecution must still prove the materiality of the statements but need not prove
that either was given with corrupt intent.
IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
"It merely eliminates what appears to be a ridiculous requirement that proof
be adduced as to which of two statements is false when one of such statements must
of necessity be so", asserts Mr. Brownell. The court in Rex v. Hook, in 1858, said,
"The common sense conclusion is . . . (that the witness) must have been guilty
of perjury on one or the other of the occasions." 22 Thus we see, with Wharton,
that the making of contradictory statements under oath as a witness brings a peculiarly different problem in prosecution. 28
The law, however, has always been as follows:
"A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the defendant, but the prosecution must
prove which of the two statements is false and must show that24statement
to be false by other evidence than the contradictory statement."
Why should not the law be changed so that the defendant's contradictions
convict him of perjury? Such a law ". . . will prevent perjurers from ... making a
mockery of our courts", writes Joseph H. Henshaw. "We do not have to accept
perjury as an indestructible evil." 25 Others who write favorably of this bill are
Warren P. Hill and Daniel Waller in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology26 and the anonymous author of a note in the Illinois Law Review.2 7
Following proof of the willful giving of contradictory statements, Professor
Wigmore also agrees as follows:
"Is it then not proper, without more, to allow the jury merely by
comparing the assertions, to determine that one or the other was perjured? ...It seems clear that the (two witness) rule here suffers an exception, that by mere comparison the jury may determine the falsity. The
purpose of the rule is to protect the accused from the false testimony of a
single witness swearing against him; here no attempt is made to convict
him upon the credit of another person; the28rule's protection is not needed;
and the rule should fall with the reason."
22 8 Cox C.C. 5 (Eng. 1858).
23 Wharton on Criminal law, vol. 2, 1842; 12th ed. 1932.
24 People v. McClintic, 160 N. W. 461 (1916); Williams v. State, 34 Ala. 462, 41 So.2d 605
(1949) ; People v. Kennedy, 221 Mich. 1, 190 N. W. 749 (1922); Blackemore v. State, 39 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 355, 265 Pac. 152 (1928).
25 Joseph L. Henshaw, Perjury, 40 Ill.
B. R. 197.
26 Legislation Concerning Alibis, Perjury, Self Incrimination, Immunity for Official Conduct and
Grand Juries, 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 629 (1949).
27 Proposed Illinois Legislation Relating to Perjury and Official Conduct, 44 Ill.
L. Rev. 112 (1949).
28 7 Wigmore, Evidence 283 (3rd ed. 1940).
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Some of our courts have expressed favorable attitudes. In United States v.
Buckner, in 1941, the court declared:
"It seems strange that in the federal courts an indictment for perjury
may not yet be drawn in the alternative and that there may not be a conviction for deliberately making oath to contradictory statements unless
the prosecution shows which of the statements was false." 29
Pennsylvania has gone far in this direction. In Commonwealth v. Bradley, the
court stated:
"When such conflicting statements are made under oath, there is
no doubt that the person making them has committed perjury but the difficulty is as to which of the statements is the false one." 8 0
Commonwealth v. Sumrak, in affirming a conviction, holds:
m ... the commission of perjury is proven by the conflicting statem'ents under oath without more and.., the problem is simply one of determining whether it was committed on the occasion charged.' 81
Commonwealth v. Glickstein held that proof that the defendant first testified
that he knew who committed the assault but at trial testified that he did not know
who did so is "sufficient to support the conviction". 32
If the defendant has stated to the grand jury, "I saw Jones strike Smith", but
at the trial of Jones asserts, "I did not see Jones strike Smith", it is clear that the
defendant has lied either to the grand jury or at trial. The defendant himself, without having his right against self-incrimination violated, has, in effect, admitted on
the latter occasion, that he lied under oath on the former occasion. Surely the
necessity of proving by two witnesses, or one witness sufficiently corroborated,
that the defendant told a falsehood, when the defendant has, in effect, admitted it,
seems superfluous, wasteful of time and effort, a serious handicap to the
conviction of perjurers and an impediment most paralyzing to the administration of
justice in our courts. A bill which encourages the prosecution and aids the conviction of perjurers without depriving the defendant of his rights is surely a bill which
merits full consideration by the legislature, bench and bar to prevent perjury from
further weakening our judicial system.
V.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION

(1) Opponents of the measure contend that since the indictment would allege
two contradictory statements without stating which is true and which is false, the
allegations would be in the disjunctive or alternative, thereby not sufficiently informing the defendant of the nature of the charge.
The Illinois Bar Association took this objection seriously enough to voice their
disapproval of the bill on this ground.8 8 A vigorous dissent in State v. Kowalczyk,
20 118 F.2d 468 (C.C.A. 2d 1941).
80 109 Pa. Super. 294, 167 Ad. 471 (1933).
81 148 Pa. Super. 412, 25 A.2d 605 (1942). In agreement is the most recent case on point, Commonwealth v. Mudd, 176 Pa. Super. 250 (1954).
82 151 Pa. Super. 421, 30 A.2d 147 (1943).
83 Expressed at their annual convention in 1947.
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wherein the indictment erroneously charged that both statements were false, finds
the indictment fatally defective in that it does not apprise the defendant of the
charge, and since it is impossible for the allegation of the falsity of each statement
to be true, it charges the defendant "with an impossible state of facts not susceptible of proof under any circumstances". 34 Writes Alison in the Criminal Law of
Scotland:
"To ...allow the prosecutor to libel on both depositions, and make

out his charge by comparing them together, without distinguishing which
contains the truth and which the falsehood, would be directly contrary to
the precision required in criminal proceedings.'- 35
It would be, states Russell on Crimes, "wholly uncertain which of the two
statements is true; now it is a clear rule of criminal law that if the evidence . ..
ieaves it wholly uncertain whether the crime charged has been committed or not,
the defendant must be acquitted." 8 6
This question was raised and squarely answered in State v. Ellenstein, wherein
the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared:
" ...the indictment is not, we think, disjunctive or in the alternative in the sense argued. The classical instances to which we are referred
are that it could not be legally charged against A that he murdered or
caused B to be murdered, or that he murdered or wounded B, or that ht
forged an instrument or caused it to be forged, or that he erected a
nuisance or caused it to be erected. But the illustrations do not carry
through; Berry is not disjunctivel char ed with one or another crime;
he is definitely and clearly charged with the single offense of false swearing. H'e is accurately informed of precisely what he is to meet. We know
of no inhibition against the authority of the legislature to declare that it
shall -be a crime for a man wilfully and under oath to make statements so
diametrically opposite that one must of necessity be false, and the accusation may be made by setting forth the contradictory statements and
alleging that one or the other, without specifying which, is false. That is
substantially what the legislature has said. We consider the underlying purpose is both clear and rational. The statute leaves the defendant
under no uncertainty as to that with which he is charged. It does not
shift the burden of proof to him and it does not deprive him of any opportunity for d'efense.''87

(2) Another objection could be easily disposed of by a further provision or
an amendment, should public policy so dictate. Where a witness has testified
falsely on direct examination, he would be most loath, were this bill to become
law, to deviate from his story at all on cross-examination. He would assuredly be
unwilling to yield up the truth if he thereby convicts himself of perjury. The cross'examiner has the well-nigh impossible burden of persuading the witness not only
to help convict the defendant but also to convict himself.

86

3 N. J. 51, 68 A.2d 835 (1949).
p. 475
1 Russell, Crimes 373 (6th ed. 1896).

87

121 N. J. L. 304, 2 A.2d 454 (1938).

84

35
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Well stated is the New York case of People v. Gillette, where the following
is declared:
"A judicial investigation or trial has for its sole object the ascertainment of the truth that justice must be done. It holds out every inducement to a witness to tell the truth by inflicting severe penalties upon
those who do not. This inducement would be destroyed if a witness could
not correct a false statement except by running the risk of being indicted
and convicted for perjury." 88
In agreement is Bishop on CriminalLaw where it is stated that, ".... the law
encourages the correction of erroneous and even contradictory false statements on
the part of a witness and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when
the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony."39
New York reaffirmed the Gillette case in People v. Glass, where the court
held that the contradictory statements statute did not "refer to a case where the
second statement is part and parcel of one oral examination in which counsel upon
cross-examination succeeds in breaking down the direct evidence, compelling the
40
witness to admit the truth".
Illinois, after considering this problem, inserted the following provision in
its pIerjury statute:
-... provided, however, that where such contradictory testimony is
in the same continuous trial, the admission in such trial by the witness
that such previous contradictory testimony in such trial was untrue,
coupled with his subsequent testimony during said trial as to the substance of such statement shall be a complete defense in any prosecution
as such truthful testimony corrected a contradictory
hereunder insofar
41
statement."
The federal courts permit a witness, under certain circumstances, to purge
himself of perjury by recanting the false testimony.' 2 New Jersey holds that,
" . . . one is not guilty of perjury who corrects his testimony before the hearing
closes."' 48 Pennsylvania, in a lower court case, the only recorded opinion in point,
also follows the majority rule, finding it supported "by the great weight of authority and with a wise policy of the law".44
A provision similar to that in the Illinois statute, it is submitted, would be a
wise addition to the proposed legislation.
(3) Of some moment are the rather strange, new and confusing situations
presented by the proposed law in regard to the limitations of the time within which
prosecutions may be brought and the duty of the jury in that regard.
126 App. Div. 685, 111 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1908).
Bishop, Criminal Law § 1044a (9th ed. 1923).
40 See n. 14, supra.
41 191 App. Div. 483, 181 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1920).
42 Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577, 99 A. L. R. 880 (C.C.A. 8th 1935); Norris v. United
States, 86 F.2d 379, reversed in 300 U.S. 564, 57 Sup. Ct. 535, 81 L. Ed. 808 (1937); LlanosSenarillos v. United States, 177 F.2d 164 (C.C.A. 9th 1949).
48 State v. Kowalczyk, 3 N. J. 51, 68 A.2d 835 (1949).
44 Commonwealth v. Irvine, 14 D. & C. 275 (Pa. 1930).
8
89
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Since the bill itself states that the contradictory statements, to be punishable by
its provisions, must be made within three years of each other, and since the federal
statute of limitations applicable to the crime of perjury is thre-e years, 45 it would
seem that if one statement is made on January 1, 1951, and the other is made before December 31, 1953, prosecution may be brought up until December 30, 1956.
If the first statement, using the above dates, was the true one, then the falsehood has been stated by the defendant within the ordinary time in which prosecutions may be brought and no problem exists. Should there be no prosecution by
the aforementioned date and the evidence against the defendant is weak, he would
be wise, in order to avoid prosecution, not to state the truth under oath at least
until December 30, 1956.
If the second statement was the truth, then the falsity has been committed in
1951, almost six years before prosecution has been brought. If the contradictory
statements are the perjury, has not the statute of limitations run as to an essential
element of the crime? Suppose the jury finds that the first statement was the falsehood for which the defendant should be convicted. Cannot the accused contend
that he is being convicted for a crime committed more than five years before
and, therefore, beyond the statute of limitations? Could he not so contend when
prosecution is first brought against him? It would seem to this writer that whether
the statute of limitations has been extended by this bill is not clear and that a
positive provision is n'eeded.
Equally disturbing is the duty of the jury. Must they agree as to which statement is the false one? It would seem, by the words of the statute that they need
not so agree and that, instead of proof that a statement of the defendant is false,
only proof that the defendant made contradictory statements is needed to convict.
The crime is complete if these statements have been willful and material and have
been given under oath in appropriate proceedings. Such perjury may be 'established
by proof of the willful giving or making of such contradictory statements without
alleging or proving which one thereof is false. If the prosecution need not prove
falsity, then the jury need not find falsity in order to convict. This would solve the
problem of a jury confronted with the dilemma that half of the jury finds the first
statement to have been false and the other half believes the second statement to
be the perjured testimony.
Cases on this subject are few and of little help. New Jersey's false swearing
statute provides that if the jury is satisfied from all the evidence that one or the
other is false and that false statement is willful it shall be sufficient for a conviction. Consequently in State v,Harris,the court held:
"It was therefore open to the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt,
as it did, that the defendant swore falsely when in the first proceeding
he had been graduated from the University of Chicago
he testified that
46
Law School."
45

46

United States, statute of limitations, Act of June 25, 1948, L. 645, § 1; 62 Stat. 828.
132 N. J. L. 54, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
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In Pennsylvania, the Sumrak case, supra, also held that the conflicting statements proved perjury, and the problem "becomes the single one of determining
whtther there is competent evidence from which the jury might find that the perjury was committed on an occasion charged in the indictment." 47 It would seem
that the usual rule is that the perjury must be ascribed to one of the two occasions.
The recommended fed-eral statute, however, would make the crime complete
upon proof of the contradiction, and falsehood on either particular occasion need
not be proved. The jury would not interest itself in the determination of which
statement is false, for the contradiction alone is the perjury. Surely there exists a
number of problems relating to the aforementioned and many other situations
which should be carefully studied and clarified before this bill ever becomes law.
(4) Last and most important of all objections is a fundamental question of
public policy which should give us pause, that is, the plight of the innocent witness.
In a typical motor vehicle case, suggests E. L. Haines, 48 a preliminary hearing
will be held in the police court shortly after the accident. The witness, often without an opportunity to prepare himself, might be questioned in detail by the magistrate, the assistant district attorney and the defense counsel, and he might have his
answers stenographically recorded as to the speed of the vehicles, the distance
traversed, th'e passengers in each car, the condition of the road, lighting, skid
marks, the identity of the drivers, the presence of other witnesses, the statements
of the parties and the 'entire sequence of events. Yet the accident took place within
a few seconds and was preceded by a rapid series of happenings difficult for a
trained, expectant expert to observe, let alone for an unprepared, shocked layman
to remember.
Many months later the same witness, called to appear in a civil suit based upon
the same accident, will be questioned even more closely. He will be expected to recall vividly details which were never very clear in his memory. The despairing
witness must remember not only what he saw and heard months earlier but also
what he said at the magistrate's court. He is confronted with the testimony of other
witnesses who have given a different version of the facts. Confused and embarrassed, not realizing that each person will see the same event differently, the
witness tries desperately to remember, to tell the truth and still to repeat his earlier
testimony. Soon he is contradicting himself. Rarely, asserts Haines, does a witness
leave the stand without having contradicted himself, and, realizing this, judges and
lawyers make allowance for it.
- Comes now the litigant who, having lost his case, blames the witness
who "let
him down", and he or his insurance adjuster, to redress a grievance or to right a
public wrong, swears out a warrant for perjury. After showing the material conSee n. 31, supra.
48 Criminal Code - Perjury - Revision of the Code - Witness Giving Contradictory Evidence Civil Liberties - Presumption of Innocence - Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 31 Can. B. Rev.
47

200 (1953).
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tradictions between the testimony of the witness at the preliminary hearing and
at the trial, the prosecution makes some showing of willfulness and then rests.
The onus now shifts to the defendant either to establish that the contradictions
were not given wilfully or be convicted. The innocent witness would be hard
pressed indeed to prove his good faith. Even should he be fortunate enough to
acquit himself, he has been prosecuted criminally and subjected to the risks, expenses and notoriety of trial without at any time having performed anything which
even loosely can be called criminal. An innocent man, so prosecuted, will learn at
all costs, never to be a witness again. "The reluctance of witnesses today to testify",
writes Haines, "will be increased by the fear that any error in their testimony is
a basis for the charge of perjury. It lets dissatisfied litigants put the criminal law
in motion by mere proof of contradictory statements. .

.

. Our system of adminis-

tering justice depends upon the willingness of citizens to go into the witness box
and testify to facts that often do not affect them. The experience of testifying is
already a terrifying ordeal for most people. Should we add new terrors?" 4 9
Extremely forceful is Chamberlayne's Best on Evidence:
". . . when we consider the nature of the offense, and that every person who appears as a witness in a court of justice is liable to be accused
of it by those against whom his evidence tells, who are frequently the
basest and most unprincipled of mankind.

. .

and when we remember

how powerless are the best rules of law without the cooperation of society
to enforce them... we shall see that the obligation of protecting witnesses
from oppression, or annoyance, by charges or threats of charges of having
borne false testimony is far paramount to that of giving even perjury
its deserts ... the law of England throws every fence around a person accused of perjury . . . the result is that in England little difficulty, com-

paratively speaking, is found in obtaining voluntary evidence for the
purposes of justice; and although many persons may escape the punishment awarded by law to perjury, instances of erroneous convictions are
unknown, and the threat to an indictment for perjury is treated by honest
and upright citizens as a brutum fulmen." ' 51
That charges or threats of charges are 'enough to make any potential witness
hesitant to perform his civic duty cannot be doubted. It is far easier to say, "I don't
know", "I didn't see it", "I couldn't tell" or "I don't remember". Will we not
reach the stage where many criminals, who otherwise would be incarcerated, will
walk the streets as free men because of the unwillingness of the citizenry to take
the stand against them? Law enforcement depends upon several seldom considered
conditions, including the willingness of the average citizen to obey the law, to aid in
apprehending those who break it and to testify in court against those people. If
we forget the latter, we risk a situation where the cure may be far worse than the
disease.

49
50

Ibid.

p. 558, 8th ed., 1908.
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Nevertheless, might answer the proponents of the measure, it is the duty of
the citizen to testify, just as it is his duty to bear arms in the defense of his country
when called upon to do so. Such sacrifices are made by every witness in every trial.
To the contention that the witness thereby risks a perjury charge, they might answer
that there is nothing unusual in false charges being brought against honest citizens
and that everyone runs such a risk every day. Private warrant cases show that criminal charges are frequently brought on unjustified and unjustifiable grounds out
of personal animosity, as a shakedown or to collect a private debt.
The witness will not, after all, be convicted of perjury because he made an
honest mistake, argue supporters of the legislation. The bill does not contemplate
that the defendant prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The vital burden
of proof which rests upon and never moves from the prosecution, the burden of
proving the defendant guilty of every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, still exists unchanged under this bill. The prosecution must prove that the
proceedings were a proper grand jury or trial proceedings, that there was a proper
administration of the oath by a court with jurisdiction and an officer with authority to do so, that there was a making of the statements in question, their contradictory nature, their materiality to the question in the issue and the willfulness
with which they were made.
Since the prosecution need not prove which statement is false, every one of
these elements must be proven about both statements. Should, for example, six of
the aforementioned elements of the crime be proven as to one statement and only
five be proven for the other, the prosecution has failed to meet its burden. "The
defendant can successfully defend by saying that they are not contradictory, or
that he did not so testify, or that either of the statements was not wilfully made...
(or that) he did not swear to both .
6.."51
Failure of the prosecution to prove just
one of the elements about either statement would mean an acquittal.
Surely the honest witness can show, if he has sworn to material contradictory
statements, that he did not mean to do so or that he had a good reason for so doing. For is there not an intent to deceive, a corrupt mental state, a mens rea required to be proven before a man can be convicted of perjury? "Actus non facti
reum nisi mens sit ftea." 5 2 Mr. Brownell's proposal calls for the "willful" giving
of the testimony. Does not this absolve the honest witness?
The present law of the United States, Pennsylvania and the jurisdictions which
have passed contradictory statements laws, that is, New York, Utah, New Jersey
and Illinois, all require that the testimony in question be given "wilfully". In
addition, however, the federal statute requires that the witness state, "contrary to
such oath states ...(what) he does not believe to be true". 58 New York and Utah
State v. Lombardo, 18 N. J. Super. 511, 87 A.2d 375 (1952).
The mere commission of an act unaccompanied by criminal intent or any other state of mind
requisite to the offense is not a crime.
58 Cited on p. 129.
51
52
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require that the testimony be given "knowingly" ;54 New Jersey 55 and Pennsylvania 56 say "corruptly" and Illinois says "corruptly and fraudulently". 57 New
Jcrsey's false swearing statute would appear to require only "wilfulness" but a
statutory definition of "wilful" states, "Wilful shall, for the purposes of this
article, be understood to mean intentional and knowing the same to be false.'' 58 No
matter what the words, it is clear that each of these jurisdictions requires a criminal
intent, a mens rea, a knowledge of the falsity, in order to convict.
What then is the element of willfulness required by every jurisdiction, but
alone insufficient to establish the needed intent? It would appear that the word
possesses none of the components of the essential criminal element above stated,
and, therefore, does not include within its orbit the components of corruptly
("viciously, wickedly" 59 ), wrongfully, fraudulently, knowingly or with intent to
mislead.
The cases define wilfully as intentionally, that is, that it is the will of the
witness to say what he is saying, whether the words are used in the definition "with
62
1
design, with some degree of deliberation", 6 0 "intentionally'6 or "deliberately".
"The essential element of perjury is that the testimony alleged to be false must
be wilfully given, that is to say, it must be intentionally and deliberately given.''68
Pennsylvania expresses it thus:
"Willful means deliberate, a person who of his own free will, deliberately, after time for consideration and not hastily '6 4 acts.
"Wilfully in common parlance does not signify corruptly .... Webster's Dictionary defines it as self-determined; voluntary; intentional.
This is its natural meaning. It is so used to distinguish an intentional act
from an involuntary one. This is the import it has received in the decisions of this state . . . . The decisions of the United States Supreme
Court are in agreement . ... "6r
The corrupt mens rea, that is the knowledge of the falsity and the intention
to mislead, is, of course, an essential element of the crime. The witness may have
testified wilfully, but he has not committed perjury unless he knows his testimony
to be false.66 The federal courts have been particularly scrupulous in this regard.
39 New York Statutes-Penal Laws, pt. 2, art. 158, Perjury, § 1620; Utah Code Ann., tit. 76,
c. 45, Perjury, § 1.
55 New Jersey Stat. Ann. 2A: 131.
56 Act of 1939, P. L. 872, § 322; 18 P.S. 432.
57 1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1395, § 227.
58 N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A: 131-7.
59 United States v. Edwards, 43 Fed. 67 (C.C.A. 5th 1890).
Krauskopf v. Tallman, 38 App. Div. 273, 56 N. Y. Supp. 967, judgment affirmed 170 N. Y.
60
561, 62 N. E. 1096 (1902) ; United States v. Howard, 132 Fed. 325 (1904).
61 People v. Frost, 120 N. Y. S.2d 911 (1953).
62
Commonwealth v. O'Grady, 4 Dist. 732 (1895).
68 See n. 61, supra.
64 See n. 62, supra.
65 Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 168 Pa. Super. 569, 79 A.2d 789 (1951).
66 Or, in some jurisdictions, if the defendant speaks recklessly, aware that he does not know
whether his statement is true or false.
r,4
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If the testimony is "due to surprise, inadvertence or mistake", 67 "weakness in the
witness",6 8 "duress", 69 "a lack of understanding of the questions" 70 or is demonstrated by "lifting a statement of the accused out of its immediate context and
thus giving it a meaning wholly different", 71 there is no perjury.
New York will not convict for "an honest mistake or misrepresentation as to
a fact in good faith", 72 "erroneous testimony", 78 "hon'est belief", 74 "inadvertence,
error or mistake" 75 or testimony given under "coercion or duress".76 Pennsylvania
also holds that perjury has not been committed where there is an "honest and
unintentional mistake" 77 or where false testimony was given "on the advice of
78
counsel".
It is to be noted that the proposed federal legislation requires only that the
contradictory statements be given "willfully". No criminal intent is required.
Despite the requirement of present federal legislation that the defendant make a
false statement "which he do'es not believe to be true", the new law would not
even require that the defendant be aware of the falsity of his own statement. The
intentions of the defendant could be completely honest, forthright and candid; he
could be a model of good citizenship and veracity; he could be telling what he
thoroughly knows to be the truth; conceivably, he could be telling the truth on
both occasions; neverth'eless, he is guilty because all that is required is that he says
something which, as it transpires, contradicts something he has said before.
It is dimly possible, however, that we are doing an unjust bill an injustice.
Perhaps it does not mean what it says, and perhaps it does not intend to make it
a crime to make a mistake. It may be, without any indication to this effect, that the
word "willful", the only mens rea required for conviction, is supposed to mean
more than it has meant heretofore. Perhaps, for the first time in our federal courts,
"willful" is intended to mean "corrupt", or "knowing the same to be false".
In that unlikely event, the bill accomplishes somewhat less than nothing.
Since the purpose of the entire statute is to eliminate the requirement of proving
falsity, and since the prosecution must prove every other element of the crime about
both statements, the prosecution must prove, not that both statements are false,
but that the defendant knew that both statements are false.
67 Luse v. United States, 49 F.2d 241 (C.C.A. 9th 1931) ; United States v. Edwards, 43 F.2d 67
(C.C.A. 5th 1890) ; United States v. Seymour, 77 F.2d 577 (C.C.A. 8th 1935); United States
v. Smith, 169 F.2d 118 (C.C.A. 6th 1948).
68 United States v. Howard, 132 Fed. 325 (1904).
69 Ibid.
70 Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 834 (C.C.A. 8th 1943).
71 Ibid.
72 People v. Bishler, 38 Hun 175 (N. Y. 1885).
73 People v. Stiglin, 238 App. Div. 407, 264 N. Y. Supp. 832 (1933).
74 People v. Caifa, 299 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1937).
75 See n. 63, supra.
76 People v. Smilen, 33 N. Y. S.2d 803 (1942).
77 Commonwealth v. Shields, 15 Pa. Super. 1 (1912).
78 Commonwealth v. Clark, 159 Pa. 257, 27 Ad. 723 (1893).
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Since the statements in question are contradictory, both cannot be true, but
one might be true. If, in the more generous event, both statements are false, then
the burden, by reason of the proposed statute, would be doubled. Instead of proving
by existing law that one statement was made corruptly, it would now be necessary
to prove that both statements were made corruptly in order to convict for perjury.
Running rapidly, we have not only arrived back where we started from, but we
have advanced-backwards.
In the more likely event that one statement is true and the other is false, the
prosecution must still prove all the elements of the crime for both statements. The
state must prove, to be specific, that th'e defendant corruptly made the true statement knowing the same to be false, and it must prove this beyond a reasonable
doubt. The burden of proving such an impossibility is clearly insuperable. The interpretation of the statute which makes "willful" mean anything more than "intentional or deliberate" clearly deprives it of any logic, fairness or sense. This bill
would, as a matter of fact, make perjury even more difficult to prove than before.
It is, therefore, apparent that "willful" means what it has meant before. Thus,
Mr. Brownell, in his zeal to catch perjurers, would make it a crime to make a mistake on the witness stand, for the correction of the mistake would constitute perjury. Having said that X is true, it would be a crime for the witness to say that
he was mistaken and that X is not true. His contradiction would be willful because in the first statement he deliberately and intentionally said what he intended
to say, even though he later realized that he was in error. He is guilty of perjury
for wilfully contradicting himself under oath unless he can show that the first
statement was not intentional, that is, that it was a result of a reflex action such as
a muscular spasm, a cough, a groan or a slip of the tongue. Pity the poor witness
who must prove one of these to save himself from the penitentiary.
The witness is guilty by reason of giving willful contradictory statements even
though he may have thoroughly believed both his prior and his subsequent testimony to be true at the time that he gave them. Yet argument may have convinced
him of the error of his earlier testimony, and h'e is endeavoring not to repeat this
earlier error; or his own reflection after he originally testified may have changed
his mind; or facts which he learned after he first testified may have proven to him
that the true nature of the situation is other than he had believed. In 1899, Greenleaf wrote the following about contradictory statements delivered under oath:
"... there is nothing to show which of them is false . . . and although the jury may believe that on one or the other occasion, the prisoner
told what is not true, yet it is not a necessary consequence that he committed perjury. For there are cases in which a person might very honestly
and conscientiously swear to a particular fact from the best of his recollection and belief, and from other circumstances, subsequently be convinced
that he was wrong and
swear to the reverse, without meaning to swear
79
falsely either time."
79

1 Greenleaf, Evidence 400 (16th ed. 1899).
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Perhaps the witness may, in the latter proceeding and while testifying differently, be fully of the opinion that he is repeating earlier testimony. It may be
that the coloring attendant upon a personal interest in the case acquired subsequently to the original testimony or his wishful thinking convinces him of certain
facts which are not entirely true. Not one of the aforementioned acts is criminal,
yet, since all of the testimony is wilfully given, the witness is guilty of perjury.
The proposed statute goes too far. A vital element is missing. Surely there is
something sadly wrong with a perjury statute which does not even mention the
word falsity. A perjury statute which does not require any proof that the defendant
knew that he was not telling the truth has lost sight of certain basic policies of the
law.
With all the possible harm inherent in this bill, it is ironic to realize how few
perjurers would be convicted under it. Labeled as a panacea to end perjury, this
bill deals with the rarest type of perjury, that of a witness who contradicts himself
on the stand. While the statistics are not known to this writer, it would seem
that this type of perjury comprises only a small minority of the many perjuries committed daily. Nevertheless while the bill would not catch perjurers, it would endanger the innocent witness.
The suggested legislation withdraws the protection of the law from the honest
witness. It would be far better to have perjurers run loose, just as before, than to
imprison one innocent man, to create apprehension and fear in the minds of others
and to discourage many from ever becoming witnesses at all. Our precious heritage
of freedom requires the protection of the innocent from the deprivation of their
liberties. While it is vital to curb perjury, it is even more necessary to protect our
witnesses. To pass an unfair and dangerous law would only replace a lesser evil
with a greater. Mr. Brownell's plan, in its present form, should, after the full consideration its purpose merits, be roundly defeated by the Congress of the United
States.
VI.

A BETTER SOLUTION

The fundamental difficulty in the prosecution of perjury is the nature of the
proof required to convict. Apart from all other offenses against the peace and
dignity of the people only perjury and treason require a greater degree of proof
than any of the others, and it is this distinction which we must examine to determine
the nature of the problem and the means to its solution.
Historically, perjury was tried in the Court of the Star Chamber, conducted
according to the ecclesiastical canon law, which adopted the quantitative theory of
evidence. "This involved a counting of the oaths given in a judicial proceeding
with victory going to the party with the greater number on his side. It was the
intrinsic value of the oath rather than the credibility of the witness' testimony
which was considered important. The Court of the Star Chamber accordingly required two oaths against the defendant's ont to sustain a charge of perjury. In
1640, when the Court of the Star Chamber was abolished by statute, jurisdiction
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over the crime of perjury was transferred to the common law courts and with it
was transferred the two-oaths rule." 80
Since defendants could not then testify in their own behalf, the

"...

charge

of perjury was the one case where a plausible inducem'ent for such a rule was presented; because in all other criminal cases the accused could not testify, and this
one oath for the prosecution was in any case something as against nothing; but
on a charge of perjury, the accused's oath was in effect in evidence, and thus, if
but one witness was offered, there would be merely (as Chief Justice Parker said)
8
oath against oath." '
Thus, based on the quantitative concept that all oaths are of equal value,
a historical fiction, the rule has descended the long, narrow path of stare decisis
and today still stands, antiquated but resplendant, as the law. It is, of course, not
true that the testimony of all individuals should be accorded equal weight. A jury,
in all other crimes, often properly disregards a barrage of witnesses and finds for
the opposing party although he may present no witnesses at all. Its quest is for the
truth, not the highest score in number of witnesses presented. For a conviction in
all other crimes, the jury must be convinced that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. This writer proposes that the proof of
perjury shall be the same.
The strictness of the rule has been somewhat ameliorated to permit a single
witness to the proof of the fact alleged to be falsely sworn plus circumstantial
evidence of corroboration, taking the place of other witnesses, to be sufficient for
a conviction.82 Nevertheless, the modified rule is but a step toward real progress.
Perjury still remains one of the hardest crimes to prove. "In all criminal cases the
guilt of the accused can be 'established by circumstantial evidence. Why cannot the
falsity of a statement in a perjury case be established by the same character of evidence?" 83
Professor Wigmore, a vigorous critic of the rule, argues:
"The rule is in its nature now incongruous in our system. The quantitative theory of testimony, if consistently applied, should enforce a
similar rule for every criminal charge, now that the accused is competent
to testify. 'Oath against oath' as a reason for the rule is indefensible ....
In modern times cogent reasons have been given for believing that the
rule has outlived its usefulness.
"1921, Hallam, J. in State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W.
613: The question is a new one in this state and we are at liberty to choose
the rule which appeals to us as being most consonant with reason. Notwithstanding the high authority above cited, we are of the opinion that
the rule laid down is out of harmony with our system of jurisprudence.
In our opinion it is one of the rules of the common law inapplicable to
our situation and 'inconsistent with our circumstances', and hence not to
80

81

United States v. Weier, 143 F.2d 204 (C.C.A. 3rd 1944).
7 Wigmore, Evidence 275 (3rd ed. 1940).

82 United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. 430 (1840).
83 Plummer v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 202, 33 S. W. 228 (1895).
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be followed. We find ourselves unable to approve the doctrine that perjury is a more heinous crime than murder or that one charged with perjury should have greater immunity than one charged with murder. Suppose, for example, the only eyewitness to a murder should testify that
the accused is not the man who committed the crime, and yet the circumstantial evidence of guilt is so strong that the jury convicts of first degree murder. With what consistency can it be said that a quality of testimony which will justify a court in condemning a defendant to life imprisonment, or, in some jurisdictions, to be hanged, is insufficient to
sustain a conviction of the falsifier of the crime of perjury for which he
may suffer a penalty of a short term of imprisonment? The lightness with
which (we are pained to say) the oath of a witness is too often treated,
does not warrant us in making conviction of the crime of perjury most
difficult of all crimes of which State courts have jurisdiction. We hold
that perjury may be proved by circumstantial evidence if84proof is made
beyond reasonable doubt as in the case of other crimes."
The New York Law Revision Committee recommended:
"If the rule should be abrogated, then the required proof would become the same as in other crimes, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
requirement of such proof would seem to be 85an adequate safeguard
against the conviction of the innocent persons."
86
Despite the Texas perjury statute's requirement of two witnesses, that state
is fully committed to the doctrine of Plummer v. State, wherein the court declared:
"We hold that the falsity of the statement can be established by
8
circumstantial evidence."
Oklahoma held that the falsity could be established by circumstantial evidence. 88 Also when defense counsel contended that prejury cannot be so proven,
the Supreme Court of Nevada replied, "We think the contention without support,
89
either in reason or in authority."

Georgia held that the rule did not apply "where the proof of the crime is
necessarily based upon circumstantial evidence". 90 Similarly, where, in a New
York case, a witness, who testified that he did not remember certain criminal acts,
was convicted of perjury, the court, upholding the conviction, declared:

84 7 Wigmore, Evidence 276 (3rd ed. 1940).
85 New York Law Revision Committee, 1935 Report (Legislative Documents, 1935, No. 60, p.

322).

Vernon's Ann. Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 123, c. 657.
Plummer v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep., 202, 33 S. W. 228 (1895) ; Maines v. State, 26 Tex.
App. 14, 9 S. W. 51 (1888) ; Beach v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 240, 22 S. W. 976 (1893) ; Rogers
v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 221, 32 S. W. 1044 (1895); Franklin v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep 346,
43 S. W. 85 (1897); Maroney v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 524, 28 S. W. 696 (1903); Miles
v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. Rep. 493, 165 S. W. 567 (1914) ; Hart v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. Rep. 322,
166 S. W. 152 (1914) ; Hays v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 213, 173 S.W. 671 (1915); Wooten v.
States, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 103, 237 S. W. 921 (1922).
98 Ex parte Metcalf, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 605, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.)513, 129 Pac. 675 (1913).
89 State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332, 27 A. L. R. 848 (1923).
90 Mallard v. State, 19 Ga. App. 89, 90 S.E. 1044 (1916).
86
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"... no witness... could swear that the defendant knew or remembered the facts which were the subjects of inquiry. That issue had to be
determined by circumstantial proof."91
The Supreme Court of Delaware criticized the two-witness rule as a foreign
growth far from satisfactory, and it criticized the reason underlying the rule as
even more unsatisfactory than the rule itself and vulnerable from several angles.
The court said:
"It is based upon the assumption that all oaths are of equal weight.
It also assumes that the oath of the defendant given in a former proceeding which is alleged to be false is the defendant's oath in the perjury case
on trial. This at least appears doubtful as it seems to make of the defendant a witness in the perjury case without his taking the witness stand,
and to clothe him with a presumption of truthfulness with no opportunity
on the part of the prosecution to attack his credibility. When the defendant becomes a witness in the perjury case and repeats the alleged false
testimony given in the prior proceeding, then there may be oath against
oath ....,92
In summary of the foregoing, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that
whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient is "a question upon which there is
a conflict of authority .... In an increasing number of jurisdictions, it is held that

a conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence, when corroborated. ...A prosecution for perjury ought not, in reason, to be hedged about with
technical rules which do not apply to prosecutions for other and quite as serious
crimes. It should not be necessary to produce a different sort of witness to prove
the falsity of an oath than to prove the commission of a homicide. We are impressed with, and adopt, the reasoning in the Storey and Plummer cases, above
quoted as being applicable to our situation and circumstances, and in harmony with
the general principles of the law." 98
In the federal courts the Third Circuit found the rule subj-ct to "well reasoned",94 "well rounded criticism", 95 and the Second Circuit found it "practically
annulled". 96 When the Fourth Circuit affirmed a conviction in a case where the
embodying the rule, the Supreme Court distrial judge refused an instruction
97
missed the writ of certiorari.
Thus an increasing number of our judges have declared the rule bankrupt. Of
hoary vintage and inapplicable to modern times, it persists, devoid of logic, prac91 People v. Doody, 72 App. Div. 372, 76 N. Y. Supp. 606, affirmed 172 N. Y. 165, 64 N. E.
P07 (1902).
92 Marvel v.State, 3 Harr. 110, 33 Del. 110, 131 Atd. 317, 42 A. L. R. 1058 (1925).
93 State v. Woolley, 192 Atl. 1 (1937).
94 United States v. Weiler, 143 F.2d 204 (C.C.A. 3rd 1944).
95 United States v. Palese, 133 F.2d 600 (C.C.A. 3rd 1943).
96 Kohn v. United States, 214 Fed. 55 (C.C.A. 2nd 1914) ; Schonfield v. United States, 277 Fed.
395 (C.C.A. 2nd 1921).
97 Goins v. United States, 306 U. S. 622, 159 Sup. Ct. 783, 83 L. Ed. 1087 (1939), affirming 99
F.2d 147 (C.C.A. 4th 1938).
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ticality or fairness, simply through precedence and a desperate survival instinct.
The gradual evolution of the law has nibbled grimly around the ancient body, but in
only a few forward-looking states has a significant bite been taken. While virtually
every jurisdiction now recognizes that one witness, sufficiently corroborated, may
prove falsity, only the jurisdictions noted above have taken steps toward the abolition of this historical curiosity. It presents an arbitrary, senseless distinction between perjury and other crimes, making it more difficult to convict a perjurer
than a murderer, despite the fact that the perjurer may be penalized by a few years
in jail but the murderer may receive the death penalty. It aids and abets perjurers
by increasing unnecessarily the difficulty of convicting them. This writer proposes
that the two-witness rule be indicted and convicted as an accessory after the fact
to perjury and that its punishment be exile to the legal histories.
The rule, obsolete and archaic, should be terminated by judicial fiat or by
statute. Instead of this anachronistic and ineffective distinction, we should provide
that perjury should be proven by the same kind and degree of proof as all other
crimes, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus can we best solve the problem of
perjury in our courts.

